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PRIVATE LAW
the company to sustain a defense on the basis of false answers
of a material nature.33
On the other hand, another court rejected, on the ground of
good faith, an insured's defense based on false and material
answers resulting in non-disclosure of a heart attack suffered
nine or ten months before the application.84 Some further de-
lineation of the proper application of R.S. 22:619B would ap-
pear to be in order.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST
Miscellaneous cases included problems such as when money
is being "conveyed" by a messenger,85 what constitutes a "blow-
out" of an oil well,36 a "collapse" of a building,3 7 and a "mys-
terious disappearance. 38 Likewise, a downspout from a gutter
was held part of a plumbing system ;39 and a suspected criminal
who was accidentally killed by a police officer when the officer
fired at his leg to ward off an attack was held an aggressor,
which relieved the company of responsibility.4 0
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
Stability is a resistance to change, and consistency with an
earlier decision provides certainty; but where the prior case
was outmoded when rendered, and was so characterized, the
33. Radosta v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 163 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1964).
34. LaFleur v. All Am. Ins. Co., 157 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
35. Sansone v. Am. Ins. Co., 245 La. 674, 160 So. 2d 575 (1964). The mes-
Senger stopped to play dice in a social club.
36. Creole Explorations v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 245 La. 927, 161 So. 2d
768 (1964).
37. Wischan v. Brockhaus, 163 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964), c't.
granted.
38. Midlo v. Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 160 So. 2d 314 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964). See Note, Proof of Mysterious Disappearance Under Theft Poli-
cies, 24 LA. L. REV. 930 (1964).
39. Schumacher v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 154 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
40. Johnson v. Combined Ins. Co., 158 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963);
ef. Brooks v. Continental Cas Co., 128 So. 183 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1930) (where
the suspect was accidentally killed by the officer when engaged in flight) ; Griffin
v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 74 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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resistance to change is retrogressive. Eighteen years ago, in
the case of Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co.,1 a Lou-
isiana couple had a car accident in Mississippi due to the hus-
band's negligence. The wife sued in Louisiana under the direct
action statute, and her suit was dismissed because the Louisiana
conflicts rule lex loci delicti required the application of Missis-
sippi law, under which a wife cannot sue her husband in tort.
In the faculty symposium article for that year, this case evoked
the following constructive criticism:
"Generally speaking, the rule of lex loci delicti has
operated very well for the adjudication of tort cases in con-
flict of laws. There always were, and there still are, strong
reasons why many questions of tort liability should be deter-
mined in accordance with the law of the place where the
damage was sustained. However, a case like the present
one brings up the question of whether the time is not ap-
proaching when broader consideration should be given to
such cases on a more comprehensive evaluation of all the
factors involved, especially the policy consideration of the
state which has the greatest or only interest in the matter.
If both husband and wife have an undisputed domicile in
one state and all their reciprocal rights and obligations with
regard to both personal and property matters are deter-
mined in relation to the law of their domicile, and if an
accident happened when their car crossed a state boundary
line- whether it be a matter of inches and minutes, or
miles and days - it hardly fits in with the total pattern of
regulating the relations between the spouses to subject this
one situation to the different law of a state with which there
is nothing but a casual and accidental association. In such
cases, it may still be possible to reach a result more in keep-
ing with the general concepts of law, without discarding the
general applicability of the conflicts rule of lex loci delicti.
In effect, there are really two distinct substantive questions,
each of which can be considered separately. The first ques-
tion, whether the behavior or acts involved create any gen-
eral tort liability, can still be determined in accordance with
the law of the place where the act took place (or the injury
inflicted). In this connection, it is necessary to separate
the general rule of liability for certain acts from the special
1. 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946).
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rule regarding liability or suability between certain persons
for these same acts; reference to the former need not neces-
sarily include the latter. The second question, concerning
the acquisition of rights and claims (or the regulation of
personal and property relations) as between husband and
wife, can then be determined in accordance with the law of
their domicile. (The holding in the principal case is not
without support in other jurisdictions [e.g., Buckeye v.
Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N. W. 342 (1931)]; but the
proposed analysis is also tenable [cf. converse situation in
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936)]
and represents a more progressive and functional attitude,
placing emphasis on the policy considerations of the state
which has the greatest and in fact the only interest in the
matter.) ''2
The same can now be said about the 1963 decision in Nichol-
son v. Atlas Assur. Corp.,3 where the earlier case was cited and
quoted for a repetition of the same fact situation. The same
result might have been reached for other reasons, but the ratio
decidendi was the mechanical application of the lex loci delicti
conflicts rule without a discriminating analysis of its propriety.
Last year, it was very encouraging when a more enlightened
and progressive approach to a conflicts problem was taken in
the Louisiana case of Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Hulett,
4
even though there were differences of opinion concerning the
actual result.5
In the Nicholson case, a quotation from the earlier Burke
case places great reliance on the torts rule of the 1934 Restate-
ment on Conflict of Laws, a rule which has not only been dis-
credited by nearly all the writers in the field but which is also
pretty much discarded by the American Law Institute itself in
its current work on Restatement of the Law Second for Conflict
of Laws. On the point here in issue, the latter work now pro-
poses: "Whether one member of a family is immune from tort
2. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term -Con-
flict of Laws, 7 LA. L. REV. 317, 319-20 (1947).
3. 156 So. 2d 245 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963).
4. 151 So. 2d 705 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
5. See Dainow, Variations on a Theme in Conflict of Laws, 24 LA. L. REV.
157 (1963); Note, 38 TUL. L. REV. 169 (1933). .
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liability to another member of the family is determined by the
local law of their domicile."
In its approach to various recent developments and works in
the field of conflict of laws, the American Law Institute is
relatively conservative; yet they have discarded the old general
rule of lex loci delicti for torts problems in order to reflect better
what is actually being done and to provide a more realistic func-
tional approach, in the following proposed conflicts rule:
"§ 379. General Principle.
"(1) The local law of the state which has the most
significant relationship with the occurrence and with the
parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort."7
By the most conservative standards, the lex loci delicti con-
flicts rule, which looks mechanically to the law of the place of
the injury, is no longer an adequate approach for the solution
of all problems in connection with tort liability in conflicts
cases; and our courts must take cognizance of this change as
part of present-day growth and development in this field of
law.
The case of Bologna Bros. v. Morrissey8 arose out of the
Louisiana sale of whiskey to a Mississippi purchaser who took
delivery with his own truck in Louisiana. Suit for payment was
brought in Louisiana by means of attachment, and the defense
was based on a Mississippi prohibition statute which provides
that if any person gives credit to another for intoxicating liquor,
he loses his debt.9 The affirmance of the lower court's judgment
for the plaintiff brings out four significant points:
(1) The Mississippi statute is procedural because it does
not destroy the obligation and only renders it unenforceable in
Mississippi courts. This might be questioned, but the issue is
not important here.
(2) The full faith and credit clause of the United States
Constitution does not require a Louisiana court to substitute
the Mississippi statute for its own laws which are within Lou-
isiana's legislative competence and properly applicable.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390g, p. 146 (Tent. Draft
No. 8, "Wrongs," April 15, 1963).
7. Id. at 3.
8. 154 So. 2d 455 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
9. MISS. CODE § 2612 (1942).
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(3) The validity of a contract is determined in accordance
with the lex loci contractus, the law of the place where it was
made, and in the present case the sale was completely consum-
.mated in Louisiana. There were negotiable instruments made
in Mississippi, and certain payments were to have been made
in Mississippi, but there can be no disputing the classification
of the contract as a Louisiana sale.
(4) Perhaps less bluntly stated but nonetheless determina-
tive is the affirmative policy of sustaining and enforcing a con-
tract made in Louisiana by a Louisiana vendor in compliance
with Louisiana law. It cannot be gainsaid that Mississippi also
had a legitimate interest in this transaction (to prevent or un-
dercut it), and a Mississippi court would certainly apply its own
law. However, in a Louisiana court there are more than enough
Louisiana interests to warrant and support the application of
Louisiana law. There are obvious advantages to a system of
conflict of laws which would make for uniformity of result
regardless of the forum, but while this objective may still be
valid it cannot cause the subordination of all other considera-
tions and must sometimes yield.
In Tooley (Pennison) v. Pennison,10 there were a number of
problems concerning child support and the separation of com-
munity property after a divorce so that the one point of con-
flict of laws may have been relatively unimportant, but its
treatment was unduly summary. During the marriage, the hus-
band purchased a property in Mississippi in his own name but
paid the price with community funds. The court stated that
since the common law prevails in Mississippi and the Louisiana
community laws do not apply there, this property belongs to
the husband's separate estate - with the community as creditor
for the money used as purchase price.
Although the court did not spell out the conflicts rule or
submit it to analysis, the decision is necessarily predicated upon
the lex rei sitae for the determination of title interests in land.
The land was in Mississippi and the court applied the presumed
Mississippi law vesting title in the husband. However, in so
doing there was not a sufficient inquiry into the law of the
state in which the land was situated. While, in the instant case,
- 10. 157 So. 2d 628 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), writ refused, 245 La. 586, 159
So.2d 290 (1964).
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it may not have made any difference, in the ultimate legal or
practical result, the problem calls for a more complete analysis
which may lead to dlifferent results where there has been a
significant change in the value of the property (for example,
by the discovery of oil).
An actual illustration of what is meant by further inquiry
into the lex rei sitae is found in the Missouri case of Depas v.
Mayo."' After accumulating their wealth in Louisiana, the hus-
band and wife moved to Missouri, where the husband used some
of these community funds to purchase land, taking title in his
own name. Later, they were divorced, and the wife sued in Mis-
souri for a half-interest in this land. Applying the Missouri
lex rei sitae, the court there found that a person who purchases
land with the money of another takes legal title in trust. Since
the purchase money had been community funds, the court de-
clared a resulting trust in one-half of the land in favor of the
wife and recognized her half interest in the property.
Instead of applying the lex rei sitae purely and simply,
where land is purchased in a separate property state with funds
identified as community property in another, or vice versa, there
may also be a characterization of the "property interest" in
accordance with the identification of the funds used as purchase
price, as distinguished from a credit for this amount of money.
1 2
In the case of Levert v. Levert,1" the Louisiana court recog-
nized a husband's Nevada divorce in which the wife's general
appearance had been entered by attorneys purporting to repre-
sent her. In this, the court conformed to the existing law on
res judicata and full faith and credit. However, the court went
on by way of dictum to indicate that if the authorization to her
attorneys were limited to waiving service of process, she would
retain the right to question the husband's domicile and the
Nevada court's jurisdiction; and the court suggested also that
even if the divorce proceedings terminated the marital relation-
ship, the wife would still preserve her alimony rights. These
11. 11 Mo. 314, 49 Am. Dec. 88 (1848).
12. See MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 189, 212, 239
(1952) ; GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 246 (4th ed. by Scoles
1964) ; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 315 and authorities cited
in n.24 (3d ed. 1963).
13. 156 So. 2d 284 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 245 La. 48, 157
So. 2d 236 (1963), but dismissed upon private settlement between the parties,
245 La. 1003, 162 So. 2d 341 (1964).
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statements are dicta, but it would become serious if the lower
court, to which the case was remanded, followed the erroneous
direction indicated by them. Waiving service of process is gen-
erally taken as equivalent to accepting service of process, and
in either event there is a voluntary submission to the juris-
diction of the court. Despite its reliance on the Louisiana case
of Eaton v. Eaton,14 the court does not bring out the distinctive
facts of that case, which has been discussed in a prior issue of
this Review.15 All three of the cited decisions of the United
States Supreme Court involved ex parte proceedings in the
divorce-granting court.16 By the court's own statement, the
Nevada proceedings in the record indicate they were not ex
parte. The only possibility of a subsequent jurisdictional chal-
lenge to the husband's domicile, or of preserving alimony rights,
is when the original proceedings have been ex parte. If the wife
could have shown that she did not authorize any appearance
at all, either by a so-called waiver of service or by a general
appearance, then the original suit would in effect have been
ex parte, and the rights reserved to her in such a case would
have been available. There is also the possibility of a forum
whose law provides for alimony as a sort of pension based on
a prior husband-wife relationship, as distinguished from ali-
mony incident to a divorce, but this is another matter not within
the scope of the present case.
In the case of Walker v. Walker,'7 the court gave full faith
and credit to the husband's Arkansas divorce where the evi-
dence fully established that his domicile was there at that time.
The more difficult alimony problem has been discussed elsewhere
in this Review.' 8
In Folds v. Folds, 9 suit was brought in Louisiana on the
basis of two Arkansas judgments for alimony. Both rendered
in the same contested suit, these judgments had resulted in a
divorce and alimony decree. Although the Arkansas court still
retained authority to make further alimony orders as need might
arise, the judgments were "final" with respect to the past due
14. 227 La. 992, 81 So. 2d 371 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 873.
15. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term -
Conflict of Laws, 16 LA. L. REV. 255, 257 (1956).
16. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948) ; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S.
416 (1957) ; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
17. 157 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
18. See discussion p. 294 supra.
19. 160 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
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and unpaid amounts fixed therein and to that extent are entitled
to full faith and credit under the jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court.20
20. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
